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VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS. By M. Cannon1 and D. 
O'Brien.2 Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc. 
1985. Pp. xxii, 330. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.95. 
Alan D. Hornstein 3 
The celebrated advocate John W. Davis, addressing a group of 
lawyers on the topic of appellate advocacy, compared himself to a 
fisherman, the judges being the fish. 4 This book is a collection of 
fish stories. What makes it a bit unusual is that it is written by the 
fish. Cannon and O'Brien have put together an interesting and in-
formative collection of essays written by judges of various courts, 
including several essays by present Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court,s past Justices,6 as well as an essay by one who 
should have been a Justice,7 one mentioned prominently for that 
position,s and one who perhaps should be.9 
The book is divided into six parts, with an introduction to each 
by the editors. Part I includes two essays that set the historical and 
political contexts in which the courts operate. The subject of Part 
II, which I shall explore in greater detail below, is the process of 
judicial decisionmaking and opinion writing. It is by far the 
lengthiest and most interesting section of the book, comprising eight 
essays.w 
The familiar questions of the appropriate level of judicial activ-
ism or restraint are the subject of Part III, "The Judiciary and the 
Constitution," and Part VI, "The Judicial Role in a Litigious Soci-
ety." Much of Part IV, "The Judiciary and Federal Regulation: 
I. Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States. 
2. Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Af-
fairs, University of Virginia. 
3. Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. I would like to thank 
Kenneth Cobleigh for his excellent research assistance and my colleague, William L. 
Reynolds, for his helpful comments. 
4. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 895 (1940). 
5. In addition to Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Stevens, 
Brennan, Powell, and Scalia are represented. 
6. Pieces by Justices Black, Jackson, Frankfurter, and the second Justice Harlan are 
included. 
7. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure. 
8. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law. 
9. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, in id. at 237. 
10. There is also a concluding one on judicial administration, using the office of Chief 
Justice under Warren Burger as a model. Although this last essay has little in common with 
the others in this section, it is interesting on its own terms, especially as a new Chief is about 
to take the con. 
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Line Drawing and Statutory Construction," deals with similar is-
sues in the context of separation of powers. These parts of the book 
differ more in title than in substance; the major difference between 
them is that one addresses the question from a constitutional per-
spective-so that the problem is framed as one of interpretivism 
versus noninterpretivism as much as in terms of activism versus re-
straint, another speaks to the judicial role vis-a-vis the legislative 
branch, and the third speaks a bit more broadly to the judicial role 
in the absence of any authoritative text. 
With the one exception of Justice Scalia's contribution, these 
sections are perhaps the weakest in the book-not because the is-
sues lack interest or are poorly presented, but because of what is left 
out and the familiarity of what is included. As might be expected, 
for example, Justice Rehnquist challenges judicial activism as anti-
democratic and hence inconsistent with the basic structure of 
American governance. Other contributors take a somewhat more 
activist view. There is nothing startlingly new. What is perhaps 
worse, much is left out. Of course, the reader ought not expect fully 
worked out theories of judicial power in essays whose average 
length is fewer than ten pages. Indeed, such brief excerpts cannot 
do justice either to the original works or to the complexity of the 
issues. For example, the selection from Judge Coffin's 273-page 
book on appellate judging11 amounts to a mere seven pages, hardly 
enough to convey even a flavor of the original. Justice Scalia's es-
say, by contrast, is only slightly reduced from the original source.12 
It is exceptional in this collection for other reasons as well. The 
topic is the most technical in the book, and its treatment the most 
scholarly, closely reasoned, and analytically sophisticated. 
The debate with which these sections of the book are con-
cerned has gone on as long as the Republic. It is here represented-
well represented by respected advocates-only in its most tradi-
tional terms. Some schools of jurisprudential thought-critical 
legal theory and law and economics theory are but two examples-
are notably absent. Nevertheless, the positions are clear and under-
standable, and despite their familiarity, it is a service to have them 
gathered in one place. One wishes, however, for a more complete 
discussion. 
The emphasis on appellate courts reflects a different sort of in-
completeness: the book contains only one brief essay concerned 
II. F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPEL· 
LATE BENCH (1980). 
12. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983). The editors mis-cite the source of the essay in their 
acknowledgements, an irritating error that obviously should not have gone uncorrected. 
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with trial court adjudication.'3 Although the editors recognize the 
distinction between trial and appellate courts, not enough is made 
of the distinction. It should be said, however, that this book is 
hardly unique in ignoring this aspect of the judicial system. Yet it is 
in the lower courts (and frequently in lawyers' offices) that much of 
what we think of as law gets done. It is in the trial courts that most 
citizens confront the machinery of law. Failure to recognize the 
importance of lower courts stands in the way of much important 
progress in understanding and reform of the justice system.I4 
Federalism is the subject of Part V, "Our Dual Constitutional 
System: The Bill of Rights and the States." Given the title of this 
part of the book, it is odd that Justice Black's contribution is not an 
elaboration of his well-known view that the fourteenth amendment 
incorporates the Bill of Rights. Instead, his essay iterates his literal-
ist view of these constitutional provisions insofar as they limit the 
federal government. It is only when we get to the essays by Justice 
Brennan and Justice Linde (of the Oregon Supreme Court) that the 
nominal subject of this part of the collection is first broached. Both 
essays address not only the responsibility of the states in safeguard-
ing the rights provided in the federal Constitution but also their role 
in securing rights through their own constitutions. Justice Linde's 
hierarchical analysis of the relationship between state and federal 
law goes a step beyond Justice Brennan's thesis that state law has a 
significant role to play in safeguarding freedom.'s The section con-
cludes with an essay by Justice O'Connor addressing a number of 
issues implicating the relationship between the federal and state 
courts. 
The editors have supplied introductory comments to each part 
of the book. These introductions are remarkably tedious reading, if 
blessedly brief. Avoiding the exertion of thought, the editors simply 
string together long series of quotations. For example, within the 
first three sentences, their introduction to Part II quotes from 
Holmes, Cardozo, and Irving Kaufman. Similarly, the editors' in-
troduction to Part III contains almost every bromide about the judi-
cial role. Where there is room for dispute the competing cliches are 
lined up and quoted-an authority for every cliche and a cliche for 
every authority. As Chief Justice Rehnquist points out, however, 
the issues are simply too important to be decided by the weight of 
cliches or slogans. 
13. Frankel, The Adversary Judge: The Experience of the Trial Judge. 
14. See Hornstein, Book Review, 44 MD. L. REV. 216, 223-24 (1985). 
15. See also Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction 
of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563 (1981). 
1987] BOOK REVIEWS 189 
Because of the weakness of these introductory essays, it is diffi-
cult to see the audience for this book.l6 Both the foreword by Chief 
Justice Burger and the editors' own preface suggest that the book is 
directed at the lay reader. But without editorial help, most lay 
readers are unlikely to make sense out of this insufficiently con-
nected, not to say disjointed, collection. For the professional, on 
the other hand, the readings are too superficial. 
Perhaps the greatest problem with this collection is that judges 
are no more qualified to address most of the issues with which the 
book is concerned than legal philosophers, political scientists, legal 
academicians, and others. At first glance, of course, one might 
think that judges have a unique vantage point from which to ad-
dress the role of the judiciary in the American federal constitutional 
system. Yet, upon reflection, there is little to suggest that the judi-
cial experience provides such a perspective for treating these issues, 
with one important exception-the task of judging itself. 
The best-seller lists teem with how-to books; it seems that there 
is an instruction manual for virtually any chore, sport, game, occu-
pation, or other activity in which one might wish to indulge, from 
repairing one's automobile to managing a multi-million dollar cor-
poration to (of course) fishing. Yet judges have been remarkably 
reticent about how they go about doing their jobs. Although per-
haps this is beginning to change, few governmental or political ac-
tivities are still so shrouded in mystery as the craft of judging. 
The beginning and end of the process are of course public-
more public than virtually any other aspect of the political process. 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, among others represented here, take 
pains to point out that the judicial process is, in the main, open and 
public. Court proceedings themselves are typically public; and no 
institution in our society is required to justify its decisions in a more 
public way than through the formal account of decision we demand 
of the courts. Yet the act, perhaps more precisely the process, of 
judging, of formulating and writing the opinion that justifies or ex-
plains results, remains hidden. 
Interestingly, the mystery seems to be shared by the actors 
themselves. By far the longest and most interesting section of this 
book is concerned with the craft of judging. What is perhaps most 
striking about these essays is the lack of any coherent or systematic 
account by the fish themselves of what it's like to swim. Judge 
Walter Schaefer put the problem well: 
16. These introductions also could have been used to bind together or to fill the gaps 
left by the selected essays. In Part III, for example, they could have served to provide some 
of the contemporary views otherwise absent from the book. 
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(W)e lack the ability to describe what happens. I have tried to analyze my own 
reactions to particular cases. When I have tried in retrospect, I have doubted some-
what the result . . . . And, when I have tried to carry on simultaneously the pro-
cess of decision and of self-analysis, the process of decision has not been natural. I 
suspect that what is lacking [are] techniques and tools which are sensitive enough 
Judge Coffin's sentiments are similar; even the editors reflect this 
view. In short, if there is any consensus to be found here, it is that 
the art of judging is done largely by feel or hunch.t7 
It is surely true that judicial decisions are not made in any pre-
cise, geometric, or formulaic way. Indeed attempts at such an ap-
proach not only fail to achieve objectivity or certainty, they tend as 
well to distort the normative voice of the law.ts One of the things 
we expect of judges is judgment. But that requires wisdom; and 
that entails at least two prerequisites: first, that the persons we se-
lect to judge be capable of wisdom; and second, that the conditions 
of the craft permit them to actualize that capacity. Much has been 
written (and recently) about judicial selection, and it is, in any 
event, beyond the scope of this review. It is the second problem 
that I wish to address here. It seems to me that we have begun to 
value cleverness over wisdom-that the facile disposition of trouble-
some issues seems to be displacing thoughtful maintenance of the 
law's integrity.t9 In short, for a number of perfectly understandable 
reasons, our law is undergoing a disintegration. Rather than the 
seamless web the law was once thought of as resembling, increas-
ingly it looks like a patchwork quilt. The common threads, the cul-
tural cohesiveness of the law, if you will, are under strains that 
should make us wary. I do not wish to overstate the problem; but it 
seems to me a real and serious one. Its symptoms include the dra-
matic increase in separate opinions that make it difficult to know 
not merely what the law is, but what values are being protected by 
the various views of it. The resort to formulaic decisionmaking is 
another troublesome symptom, as well as a contributing cause of 
the problem.2o 
Now, to a considerable extent the problem is inevitable. The 
larger society of which the courts are a partial reflection is itself less 
cohesive than in the past. As one contributor to this collection puts 
it, our modem historical circumstance lacks any common religious 
17. Not represented in this collection is Hutcheson who, if not the first, is surely the 
most well known declarant of the judicial hunch. See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: 
The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CoRNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). 
18. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985). 
19. Cf R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). See generally Farber, The Case Against 
Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986). 
20. Nagel, supra note 18. 
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or moral order. Even if this overstates our current situation, our 
culture is surely more fragmented than in the past. The typical col-
lege curriculum, for example, displays a long list of apparently un-
connected offerings-a smorgasbord of more or less nourishing 
individual items, but rarely anything approaching a planned din-
ner.2t One might expect a more integrated, cohesive fabric in a sys-
tem with one Supreme Court, thirteen states, and four million 
citizens22 than in a system with one Supreme Court, fifty states, and 
226 million citizens.23 There are now 652 federal judges,24 com-
pared with 505 authorized judgeships only ten years ago.25 One 
obvious result is that collegiality inevitably suffers, and the decline 
in collegiality results in a more pluralistic vision. 
Not only has the size of courts grown, but there has been a 
corresponding increase in the size of supporting staff. In the name 
of efficiency, the craft of judging (like much else in our highly com-
plex technological society) has become more impersonal. If the 
quality of opinions is more important than their quantity, there is 
also a felt necessity to move the docket. At least one contributor to 
this collection of essays has noted as well the onset of "a kind of 
institutional judging," that relies on support staff to a considerable 
extent. This growth in supporting personnel was made necessary 
because the number of filings has multiplied enormously as well. 
Perhaps even more significant is the increased complexity of the 
cases, both factually and doctrinally, sometimes involving 
thousands of pages of records and dozens of issues. Despite the 
demands of efficiency, the institutionalization of judging has had 
some unfortunate consequences. 
One difficulty aggravated by the growth of supporting person-
nel is the further atomization of the law. Judges in the federal sys-
tem have life tenure, and most state court judges have a relatively 
long tenure. The classical justification is judicial independence. 
There is, however, another benefit to be derived from extended ten-
ure: continuity, a sense of participation in and commitment to the 
judicial enterprise that takes time to develop. Surely it does not 
develop overnight. At least at present, there is little of the fossiliza-
21. SeeM. ADLER, A GUIDEBOOK TO LEARNING: FOR A LIFELONG PURSUIT OF WIS· 
DOM (1986). 
22. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (1975). 
23. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 5 (106th ed. 1986). 
24. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 748 (1986). 
25. 1983 DIR. Ao. OFFICE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 3. 
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tion that can occur without the injection of fresh blood. The danger 
is rather the opposite. 
One manifestation of this danger is the now ubiquitous law 
clerk. Almost every judge has at least one; many have more. The 
clerk's role and responsibility is determined almost entirely by her 
judge. The judge, of course, bears the ultimate responsibility for 
every opinion leaving her chambers, and it is still true that judges 
do more of their own work than any comparable group in our 
political system. Nevertheless, today's law clerk undertakes much 
that in more leisurely times would have been done by the judge. 
The problem with this is not so much the lack of accountability; law 
clerks are probably under sufficiently close supervision and, like 
judges, must justify what they do through reasoned and written dis-
course. Nor is the problem lack of ability. If the truth be told, a 
law clerk may well have more intellectual power than her judge. 
Most clerks are at or near the top of their classes at fine law schools. 
Unlike judges, they obtain their positions almost entirely on the ba-
sis of their legal abilities. 
The problem instead is the diminution in cultural continuity.26 
By and large, clerks are hired immediately out of law school where 
they have been exposed to the fashionable, avant-garde ideas. They 
serve for terms of a year or two. Thus there is constant turnover of 
bright but inexperienced personnel, many of whom are given signifi-
cant responsibilities. Without experience in the law-sometimes 
with little significant life experience beyond two decades of school-
ing-these brilliant tyros may yet have significant impact on 
doctrinal development. Any single case, even any moderately large 
sampling of cases may not exhibit the symptoms. Yet the common 
threads, the philosophical coherence of the law suffers. To my 
mind much of the indeterminancy to which critical legal theorists 
attend is symptomatic of this fragmenting of legal culture. 
The heavier demands on judges have other consequences. As 
several of the contributors to this collection point out, judging is 
often at least in part a matter of hunch or feel. That is one of the 
reasons judges must be selected with great care. But time to con-
template, as well as a personality disposed to do so, is essential. 
"Why do we not have more great judges like the mighty jurists of 
yesteryear? To some degree, perhaps, we are lesser people today. 
But perhaps another reason is that, to produce great decisions, a 
judge must have time to think, [to] ponder ... " More than that, 
because cases and problems rarely exist in isolation, because law 
26. Cf Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 251 
(1986) (problem of lack of acculturation in legal academia). 
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(life, too) really is a seamless web, judges must understand the 
larger cultural context of law.21 All of this is made extremely diffi-
cult by the need to move the docket. 
Solutions are not easy. Converting law clerk positions to ca-
reer jobs may help increase continuity but is likely to have unfortu-
nate side effects. The level of ability and intelligence is likely to 
suffer significantly. These positions will no longer be sought by the 
best and the brightest of law school graduates. Moreover, the new 
approaches, the fresh look at problems that new clerks can bring to 
a judge's chambers will suffer. Other difficulties are likely to arise if 
more experienced lawyers are sought for these positions. It seems 
unlikely that those in mid-career will take a year or more to serve as 
a law clerk. Moreover, older law clerks might feel less willing to 
defer to the judge. (Query whether the arrogance of youth is less a 
problem in this regard.) 
At the federal level at least, a possible ameliorative might be 
expansion of the Judicial Fellowship Program, now devoted primar-
ily to court administration and limited to work with the Supreme 
Court, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Administrative Office of 
the Courts. Judges with more than one clerk might be invited to 
replace one of them with a Fellow, who would serve the chambers 
for two or three years. The Fellows-as a practical matter, proba-
bly academics-might offer a fuller vision to the judicial branch 
while being able to use the experience gained there to enrich the 
education of their charges upon a return to the academy. Indeed, 
even established professors might welcome a working sabbatical of 
service to the courts.2s 
Providing opportunities for judges themselves to regain a 
deeper understanding of law is also difficult. Fortunately there 
seems to be a growing awareness of the importance of cultural heri-
27. Recall the advice Felix Frankfurter wrote to a youngster who had inquired about 
how to prepare himself for a career at the bar: 
No one can be a truly competent lawyer unless he is a cultivated man. If I were 
you, I would forget all about any technical preparation for the law. The best way to 
prepare for the law is to come to the study of the law as a well-read person. Thus 
alone can one acquire the capacity to use the English language on paper and in 
speech and with the habits of clear thinking which only a truly liberal education can 
give. No less important for a lawyer is the cultivation of the imaginative faculties 
by reading poetry. seeing great paintings, in the original or in easily available repro-
ductions, and listening to great music. Stock your mind with the deposit of much 
good reading, and widen and deepen your feelings by experiencing vicariously as 
much as possible the wonderful mysteries of the universe, and forget all about your 
future career. 
2 THE WORLD OF LAW 725 (E. London ed. 1960). 
28. Such a program ought not be costly. First, a Fellow would serve in lieu of one of a 
judge's clerks, so no additional salary line would be necessary. Further. at least to the extent 
Fellows would be recruited from the academy. competitive salaries need not be exorbitant. 
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tage to the life of the law, and some first few steps are being taken. 
The Aspen Institute's well-known program for executives is open to 
judges. Brandeis University has begun a program for judges in 
Massachusetts that plugs them into the cultural tradition through 
exploration of certain literary works.29 The ideas underlying that 
program have begun to spread. The Judicial Institute of Maryland, 
for example, is planning a program on "Judging Through the Look-
ing Glass of Literature"; similar programs are being developed else-
where. The National Center for State Courts, the National Judicial 
College and similar institutions could render much needed encour-
agement and support to such efforts. A beginning has been made; 
much remains to be done. 
Another possibility-somewhat more costly, but worth it-
would be provision for periodic sabbaticals for judges. Just as 
scholars require refreshment without the normal demands of teach-
ing or administration, judges would profit enormously from an ex-
tended time for reflection and renewal. 
The result of the several pressures on the judicial system is that 
judges have less opportunity to develop the wisdom and the ethical 
compass they need. The absence of cultural ethos leads ineluctably 
to the disintegration of law, and ultimately to the fears expressed by 
Roger Cramton in a slightly different context: "a moral relativism 
tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral 
instrumentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism."Jo We must 
begin to take steps to reawaken judicial awareness of the cultural 
context in which law plays out, so that we might retain-or 
regain-our confidence in the cultural and doctrinal integrity of 
views from the bench. 
29. Garred, Judges Lit, NEW AGE J., Oct. 1984, at 27; Touster, Parables for the Profes· 
sions, 5 BRANDEIS REv., Winter 1986, at 2; Touster, ParablesforJudges, B. B. J., Nov. 1983, 
at 4. 
30. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL Eouc. 
24 7, 262 (1978). 
